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Abstract—Bioinformatics is a large group of methods used in
biology, mostly for analysis of gene sequences. The algorithms
developed for this task have recently found a new application
in network threat detection. This paper is an introduction to
this area of research, presenting a survey of bioinformatics
methods applied to this task, outlining the individual tasks
and methods used to solve them. It is argued that the early
conclusion that such methods are ineffective against polymor-
phic attacks is in fact too pessimistic.
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1. Introduction
When biologists discover a new gene, its function is not al-
ways apparent. The usual approach is to compare its struc-
ture with genes, whose function has already been identiﬁed.
Comparison (so-called alignment) of biological sequences
is a basis for bioinformatics, a science focused on theories,
algorithms, computational techniques and statistical meth-
ods, with the goal of solving problems of biological data
analysis [1]. Bioinformatics draws inspiration from many
other branches of science and the techniques it provides
often have interesting applications outside of biology – in-
cluding automatic voice and handwriting recognition, but
also in computing systems security. This paper focuses on
methods of deﬁning the similarity between biological se-
quences and shows, how similar methods can be applied
to the problem of recognition and characterization of com-
puter network threats.
2. Sequence alignment
Sequence alignment is a tool used in bioinformatics to de-
ﬁne and visualize a measure of similarity between DNA or
protein sequences.
Deﬁnition 1 (from [2]) : A (global) alignment of two
strings S1 and S2 is obtained by ﬁrst inserting chosen spaces
(or dashes), either into or at the ends of S1 and S2, and then
placing the two resulting strings one above the other so that
every character or space in either string is opposite a unique
character or a unique space in the other string.
For example, in the alignment
c a c _ d b d
c a w x _ b _
of strings cacdbd and cawxb, character c is mismatched
with w, both d’s and the x are opposite spaces, and all
other characters are in matches.
Deﬁnition 2 (from [2]) : A global multiple alignment of
k > 2 strings S = S1,S2, ...,Sk is a natural generalization
of alignment for two strings. Chosen spaces are inserted
into (or at either end of) each of the k strings so that the re-
sulting strings have the same length, deﬁned to be l. Then
the strings are arrayed in k rows of l columns each, so
that each character and space of each string is in a unique
column.
Alignment is necessary, since evolutionary processes intro-
duce mutations in the DNA and biologists do not know,
whether nth symbol in one sequence indeed corresponds to
the nth symbol of the other sequence – a shift is probable.
Deﬁnition 3 (from [2]) : The edit distance between two
strings is deﬁned as the minimum number of edit oper-
ations – insertions, deletions, and substitutions – needed to
transform the ﬁrst string into the second. For emphasis,
note that matches are not counted.
Edit distance is sometimes referred to as Levenshtein dis-
tance in recognition of the paper [3] by V. Levenshtein
where edit distance was probably ﬁrst discussed.
Sequence alignment is a generalization of an intuitive ap-
proach to analysis of similarity between sequences, based
on searching for the longest common subsequence (LCS).
The LCS is found by inserting gaps in the two sequences,
so that they can be aligned with a maximum possible num-
ber of matching characters. This operation uses a simple
scoring function: “+1 for a matching character, 0 other-
wise.” In real biological applications more complicated
scoring matrices are used, assigning more points to match-
ing known functional biological sequences, giving points
for aligning characters which do not strictly match, but are
similar from the point of view of their biological func-
tion, and also subtracting points for non-matching charac-
ters and gaps in unexpected places. The ﬁnal score is usu-
ally simply a sum of points for all pairs of characters. The
alignment is therefore optimal, when the similarity is great-
est, resulting in the highest score with the selected scoring
matrix [4].
The optimal path leading to the best alignment is found
using dynamic programming algorithms. The most well-
known dynamic programming algorithm used in bioinfor-
matics for this task is the Needleman-Wunsch algorithm.
The goal is to ﬁnd the best global alignment of two se-
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quences of characters. Global alignment answers the ques-
tion, how similar are the two compared sequences along
their entire length. Usually the compared sequences are
of similar length, however in some cases the sequences
are very diﬀerent, except for some shorter, similar sub-
sequences. Sometimes it is also necessary to compare
sequences of very diﬀerent lengths. In this case a local
alignment algorithm is better. An example of such algo-
rithm is the Smith-Waterman algorithm, a modiﬁcation of
the Needleman-Wunsch algorithm. Given a scoring func-
tion, the algorithm is designed to ﬁnd the most similar pair
of subsequences of both sequences. In the local alignment
problem the ﬁnal score is computed only on the pair of
subsequences, omitting the rest of the characters. The dif-
ference between local and global alignment is illustrated
below [5].
Global alignment:
--AGATCCGGATGGT--GTGACATGCGAT--AAG--AGGCGTT
||| | | | ||||| |||||| ||| | | ||
GTCCATCTG--TCTTGGGTGAC-TGCGATACAAGTTA--CCTT
Local alignment:
--AGATCCGGATGGT--[GTGACATGCGATA]--AG--AGGCGTT
||||| |||||||
GTCCATCTG--TCTTGG[GTGAC-TGCGATA]CAAGTTA--CCTT
3. Sequence alignment and network
threat recognition
Sequence alignment is a useful tool for network threat
recognition in intrusion detection systems, automated threat
signature generators and in malware analysis. To recognize
a threat it is necessary to compare the new, observed be-
havior with previously identiﬁed or exemplary malicious
behavior. The comparison is more useful, if it is not
strict – this facilitates the detection of variants of attacks
(behaviors) or attempts at masking the attack. Just like in
bioinformatics problems, the main task is to ﬁnd regulari-
ties, repeating similar sequences in large datasets.
4. Anomaly detection
One of the ﬁrst applications of sequence alignment to intru-
sion detection is mentioned in [5] – with explicit connection
to bioinformatics. The authors focused on the problem of
detection of masquerading attempts, using logs of the acct
tool in Unix systems as input data. Masquerading detec-
tion involves a user signature – a sequence of commands
collected from the user, compared with the current session
of this user. The main assumption is that an intruder using
another user’s account will behave in a diﬀerent way than
the rightful owner of the account, and that this diﬀerence
of issued commands should be detectable. The paper pro-
poses a method of aligning sequences of commands from
the current session with the user signature using a modi-
ﬁed version of the Smith-Waterman algorithm. The result
of the alignment, using a proposed scoring function, is used
to detect an intrusion. In the opinion of the authors a lo-
cal alignment would not be suﬃciently eﬀective, as a lot
of potentially interesting data would be ignored. There-
fore, the authors have used a semi-global alignment. In
this type of alignment only the suﬃxes or preﬁxes of com-
pared sequences are aligned. The scoring function rewards
matching commands, but does not penalize the existence
of large, non-matching parts of the signature. As in every
anomaly detection method, an arbitrary threshold must be
chosen to separate a suspected intrusion from a normal, but
slightly atypical session of the original user – this thresh-
old was found empirically. The best experimental results
show a 75.8% intrusion detection level with 7.7% of false
positives. A full description of the algorithm, the scoring
function, data preparation method and analysis of results
can be found in [5].
Another method of intrusion detection, popular in the lit-
erature but rarely used on a wide scale is system call mon-
itoring – the system calls of processes are monitored and
compared to typical behavior of a given type of processes.
Diﬀerences in behavior could indicate a successful attack
on the application, resulting in execution of potentially ma-
licious code. A recently proposed extension of this idea
is based on evolutionary distance between sequences, de-
ﬁned as the sum of costs of substitutions, deletions and
insertions. Instead of creating a model of the behavior of
the monitored process, a “replica” of the process is cre-
ated and executed in parallel. A diﬀerence in behavior of
the two processes may be a symptom of an attack. Since
an eﬀect of the same attack on two identical processes on
identical platforms must, by deﬁnition, be the same, diver-
siﬁcation of replicas is necessary. Thus, good candidates
for a replica are: the same process running on a diﬀerent
platform (e.g., Windows instead of Linux), or even a dif-
ferent process with the same functionality (e.g., a diﬀerent
WWW server) on a diﬀerent platform. The authors of the
idea assume that even though the processes will use diﬀer-
ent system calls, the function of those calls will be similar.
It is possible to correlate diﬀerent system calls from dif-
ferent processes/platforms. A description of the method of
computing the behavioral distance between processes and
of the experimental results can be found in the paper [6]. In
the next paper [7] the authors used hidden Markov models
for this task.
5. Threat signature generation
Bioinformatics are much more often mentioned in the liter-
ature on network threats in the context of threat signature
generation systems. This area of research has gained a lot
of attention in the recent years. New, unknown threats ap-
pear very often. They are initially not recognized by the
traditional intrusion detection systems based on threat sig-
natures, since a signature has not been created yet. In this
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case a very useful tool is an automatic system, capable
of recognizing a new threat and generating its signature,
preferably without human intervention.
The ﬁrst system to automatically generate threat signatures
was honeycomb [8], a plug-in for honeyd. While the sys-
tem itself was not based on bioinformatics methods, it did
use some algorithms for detection of repeating similar se-
quences. The system applied the longest common sub-
string1 algorithm to ﬁnd common sequences of bytes in
diﬀerent packets sent to the system. As the system was
a part of a honeypot, all incoming packets were by def-
inition suspected to be part of an attack. Unfortunately,
the system did not scale well in real honeypot networks,
it generated a lot of repeating signatures and was com-
pletely useless against polymorphic attacks. Additionally,
lack of implemented signature management methods meant
that with time it was diﬃcult to tell, which signatures (and
attacks) are indeed new.
Honeycomb had many successors, using diﬀerent methods
to recognize repeating sequences in the data stream, using
them as the basis for signature generation. However, more
advanced bioinformatics algorithms were not proposed un-
til polymorphic attacks were targeted. In a polymorphic
attack there are, by deﬁnition, few constant substrings
(subsequences without gaps), common among all instances
of the attack. Furthermore, the longest such substring, if
found, is not necessarily the best sequence describing the
attack.
For many years identiﬁcation of a polymorphic attack us-
ing signatures expressed as subsequences of the attack was
thought impossible. Signature-based intrusion detection
systems were expected to disappear soon. However, in pa-
per [9] it was shown, that every polymorphic attack must
contain constant, repeating values, allowing the attack to
successfully exploit a given vulnerability. Some constants
are also required to use a given protocol to communicate
with the attacked application. Description of such an attack
is, therefore, possible, although diﬃcult – a good descrip-
tion of the attack is neither a single common substring,
nor the longest common subsequence, which might contain
too many random individual characters. A local alignment
is necessary to ﬁnd a common region in all variants of
a polymorphic attack. This approach was suggested in the
polygraph system. It is a signature generation system,
using information from another system to identify suspect
ﬂows. Using a set of such ﬂows a signature is created as
a set of short separate character sequences. For example,
a signature for the Apache-Knacker exploit was as follows
(expressed as a regular expression):
GET .* HTTP/1.1\r\n.*:.* \r\nHost:.* \r\n
.*:.*\r\nHost:.*\xFF\xBF.*\r\n
To ﬁnd common characters for the ﬂows the authors
used a modiﬁed version of the Smith-Waterman algorithm.
1A diﬀerent term than longest common subsequence (LCS) – it is by
deﬁnition continuous, while the LCS may contain gaps. The resulting
alignment is therefore diﬀerent – the longest common substring usually is
not simply the longest continuous part of the LCS.
The modiﬁcation included rewarding continuous alignment,
since such signatures are less likely to cause false positives.
Groups of characters were rewarded, while gaps were pe-
nalized, where gaps are not only the maximal length of
subsequences matched with spaces, but also the maximal
length of subsequences of non-matching characters. The
penalties were selected so that character sequences were
more likely to be aligned if their grouping is typical for
a given protocol. In practice this would mean that diﬀerent
scoring functions for diﬀerent protocols should be devel-
oped.
In the experiment carried out by its authors, the system
was tested on three real exploits – two for httpd servers
(the Apache-Knacker exploit and the ATPhttpd exploit) and
one for BIND server (the BIND-TSIG exploit). Clet, a well
known tool for polymorphic attack generation was used. It
was found, that Clet had many weaknesses – in each variant
of the exploit many constant sequences were found. Since
the goal of the experiment was to test the system with the
assumption of nearly perfect polymorphism, the code of the
exploit was manually changed using random values, leav-
ing the sequences necessary for its functioning intact. The
signature generator based on the modiﬁed Smith-Waterman
algorithm produced the correct signature in all tests, giving
0.0008% false positives for Apache-Knacker, and 0% for
the BIND-TSIG exploit – veriﬁed against a test pool of
“proper” traﬃc. Results for the ATPhttpd exploit were not
published. Only 3 samples of the exploit were necessary
to reach such a high level of precision. The generated sig-
natures can be used in many modern intrusion detection
systems like snort.
Another approach to polymorphic worm detection was
used in [10]. Like in the previous case, common regions
were searched for – using Gibbs sampling and creating sig-
natures based on the frequencies of individual characters.
Gibbs sampling is also used in bioinformatics to ﬁnd mo-
tifs – unchanged by evolution regions in protein sequences.
6. Honeypot development
Bioinformatics methods can be of great value for honey-
pot developers. Honeypots are often the main source of
information on new threats and a basis for early warning
systems. The best honeypots are real systems with real ap-
plications. However, their installation and management is
complicated and time consuming. This led to the creation
of honeypots like honeyd and nepenthes [11], emulating
the attacked services. They are easy to deploy and man-
age, even on a large scale, because the attacks on emulated
services are – by deﬁnition – never successful, so the hon-
eypots themselves are not infected. The downside of emu-
lation are its limitations – it is never perfect (bug-for-bug
compatibility is diﬃcult to attain, especially for unknown
bugs), and a honeypot is only as good as the emulation.
The problem is how to create new emulation modules for
services and their vulnerabilities in a fast and easy way. Au-
tomatic tools have been proposed – including ScriptGen,
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which can generate new honeyd scripts and aims to add
the ability to generate nepenthes modules. It functions in
three steps:
– running a real system as honeypot, registering incom-
ing traﬃc;
– traﬃc analysis without knowing the semantics of the
observed protocols, by aligning many sequences of
requests and answers and building a state automata
based on the result of this analysis;
– creating a honeyd script based on the state automata.
A full description of the methods can be found in pa-
pers [12] and [13].
7. Summary
Bioinformatics methods are a promising approach to the
problem of network threat detection and recognition. How-
ever, in most cases their only application are tests in lab-
oratories. It seems that their most promising application
from the practical point of view would be the generation
of signatures for polymorphic attacks, more general signa-
tures with a low level of false positives, creation of tools
for management of automatically generated signatures and
for extending the capabilities of honeypots (in tools like
ScriptGen). An important conclusion is that bioinfor-
matics methods have shown that the popular opinion that
polymorphic attacks will make description and detection
based on signatures of characteristic sequences obsolete is
wrong.
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